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In the early 1990s, University of California-Berkeley law professor Phillip E. Johnson published his book Darwin on Trial, a scathing exposure of contemporary evolutionary biology's refusal to brook any criticism or examination of its axiomatic materialisitic naturalism. Needless to say, the book was not well received by the examinees. At the time, Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard was the best-known and (presumably) articulate defender, nay, public educator and promoter of evolutionary biology. Everyone expected that he would offer the definitive and most deflating critique of Johnson's book.

And so it came about that Gould's four-page review of Darwin on Trial appeared in the July 1992 edition of Scientific American. The effort proved to be somewhat hit-and-miss, with several "criticisms" too off the point for further consideration. But here are five of the most important arguments Gould made against Johnson's work:

1. There is no conflict between Darwinian science and religious belief or even atheism. Gould cited the example of Theodosius Dobzhansky, one of the great evolutionary biologists of the 20th century, calling him "a believing Russian Orthodox." The problem is, Dobzhansky was a pantheist who expected Darwinism to provide the basis for a great humanistic religion (somewhat akin to Julian Huxley's hope) and could hardly be considered a faithful Orthodox Christian. That there is no conflict between Darwinism and atheism is readily seen--in fact, Darwinism as a form of materialistic naturalism requires atheism or some form of deism that is practically the same thing. But orthodox theism of any stripe is automatically excluded. Other Darwinists, as we have seen with William Provine, have been much more transparent on this point.

2. Johnson neglected sexual recombination as a method of variation. By this Gould intended to point out that mutation and selection are not the only mechanisms by which variation occurs from generation to generation. True, but this objection is inconsequential to Johnson's critique, because recombination can account only for immediate variation but not genuine genetic innovation, i.e., no new genetic information is gained in the resortment or shuffling and cannot account for the development of new characteristics or functions.

3. Darwinian evolution should be judged successful as a historical science. As we have seen, undoubtedly Darwinism has enormous explanatory power. But the question is actually, "Is it true?" not, "Does it provide a good model of reality?" Ptolemaic astronomy had superior explanatory power when Copernicus first proposed his heliocentric model but that did not make the former true.

4. Johnson gives insufficient credit to positive evidence for macroevolution such as the therapsids. But recall that it is acknowledged by critics that the therapsids are a point in favor of the Darwinists. The objection is that so much is claimed on the basis of single data bits such as this. It is insufficient and actually wrong to consider just the positive evidence and ignore the negative evidence.

5. Johnson's quotes of figures like Simpson and Mayr are out of date and therefore irrelevant to the current issue. In general, one wants to refer to the best, most contemporary sources when dealing with the technical aspects of the issue. But it remains legitimate to consult historically significant and influential thought leaders, including Darwin himself, when considering the claims made on behalf of the theory, expecially when it reaches past explanations of biological phenomena into metaphysics.

How did Johnson respond to this review? Other than the specifics already mentioned, overall he was disappointed by Gould's efforts. He wrote that they actually have a lot in common, but "What divide us are the same metaphysical questions that I have debated with Steven Weinberg and Michael Ruse: Is 'science' by definition simply applied materialistic philosophy? If so, is naturalism simply the same thing as 'reason' or can naturalism itself be questioned on rational grounds?" In essence, the poor quality of Gould's critique reveals the weakness of his arguments, implying that he really had no reponses on the merits of Johnson's criticisms. Gould seemed to be unwilling to engage on the wider, more fundamental questions of truth.

So Johnson's charge is confirmed. Science and non-science (non-sense?) are treated as separate but "equal" and all that entails. Per Gould in his reply to Johnson, "Science treats factual reality, while religion struggles with human morality," thus invoking the fact-value divide and relegating religion to the category of subjective opinion and non-rationality. And "separate but equal" here has the same effect as it did in American racial policies of the last century. It is an inherent statement of actual inequality.